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Liability of Unincorporated Association for
Tortious Injury to a Member
JUDSON A. CRANE*
Professor Crane discusses three distinct theories of tort liability of the
unincorporated association, distinguishing the various types of organiza-
tions as to limits of liability. The author advocates the cessation of the
fiction of coprincipalship in the case of large associations where there
is centralization of management. He urges acceptance of the entity
theory of partnerships and an amendment to section 13 of the Uniform
Partnership Act.
Whether a partnership should be treated as a legal entity has been
discussed in connection with the drafting of the Uniform Partnership
Act' and its interpretation.2 It seems that the act is in some respects
consistent with the entity theory, particularly in the creation of "tenure
in partnership" of the joint property. As to liability of the partnership
for tortious injury of a member by the partners or partnership em-
ployees, it seems clearly to have adopted the non-entity or aggregate
approach. Section 13 provides that the partnership is liable for loss
or injury by wrongful act or omission caused -to any person not being
a partner in the partnership.3 This is an application of a general propo-
sition that the participants in a joint enterprise are coprincipals as to
the acts or omissions of co-participants and their employees. Under
*Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law; author, Crane
on Partnership (2d ed. 1952).
1. Mazzuchelli v. Silberberg, 29 N.J. 15, 148 A.2d 8 (1959); Crane, The
Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism, 28 HAiv. L. REv. 762 (1915); Crane, The
Uniform Partnership Act and Legal Persons, 29 HAv. L. REv. 838 (1916); Lewis,
The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HAv. L. REv. 158,
291 (1916); Comment, The Partnership as a Legal Entity, 41 CoLUm. L. REv. 698
(1941).
2. CRANE, PARTNERsHinp § 3 (2d ed. 1952). Many statutes defining "person" as
including partnerships have been held to have treated the partnership as an entity for
the purpose of the statute. See United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121
(1958) imposing criminal liability on the partnership as a distinct legal person.
3. UNIFORM PARTNEmaSm Act § 13: "Section 13-(Partnership Bound by Partner's
Wrongful Act.) Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in
the ordinary course of the business of the partnership, or with the authority of the
co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partner-
ship, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent
as the partner so acting or omitting to act."
The partners are liable for harm caused by the negligent act of an employee,
Soberg v. Sanders, 243 Mich. 429, 220 N.W. 781 (1928).
4. Non-liability for negligent acts injuring a member of an unincorporated asso-
ciation is set forth with citations of cases in an annotation, "Recovery by Member from
Unincorporated Association for Injuries Inflicted by Tort of Fellow Member," 14
A.L.R.2d 473 (1950), from which a quotation is made in Inglis v. Operating Union 12,
18 Cal. Rpr. 187 (1961), aff'd, 23 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1962).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the aggregate view, partners are coprincipals. The negligence of a
partner or employee is imputed to all the partners, including a partner
injured thereby. He cannot sue himself for his own negligence, nor
can he sue himself along with his associates, to all of whom the
negligence is imputed. This rule has been carried to the extent of
denying a partner injured by the concurring negligence of a third
person and his copartner a right of action against the third person, as
he is legally charged with contributory negligence.5 That under
procedural rules a partnership or other unincorporated association can
be sued in the common name does not alter the substantive law as to
liabilities.6 It makes the association an entity only for procedural
purposes.
If an association is treated generally as a legal entity there is no
such difficulty in holding it liable for a tortious injury to an associate.
This is illustrated in the cases of a New York joint stock company.7 A
limited partnership association, still possible in a few states, is held
liable under workmens' compensation acts for injury to a working
member.8
While a partner in an ordinary partnership is generally not entitled
to the benefits of workmens' compensation, unless it is expressly pro-
vided for by terms of the statute, the partner is covered in a jurisdic-
tion which treats the partnership as a legal entity.9 In several
situations other than personal injury to a partner, workmens' com-
pensation acts have been applied in a way consistent with the entity
approach. 10
5. Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 288 P.2d 12 (1955).
6. Inglis v. Operating Union 12, supra note 4; Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J.
456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952).
7. Saltsman v. Shults, 14 Hun 256 (N.Y. 1878), a nuisance, citing Westcott v.
Fargo, 61 N.Y. 542 (1875), a contract action.
8. Carle v. Carle Tool & Eng'r Co., 36 N.J. Super. 36, 114 A.2d 738 (Super. Ct.
1955). Where the period for which the association was organized has run out, but it
continues in business it is neither de jure nor de facto a limited partnership associa-
tion, but an ordinary partnership, whose members, though working for pay, are not
entitled to the benefits of the workmen's compensation act. Leventhal v. Atlantic
Rainbow Printing Co., 68 N.J. 177, 172 A.2d 710 (1961).
9. Trappey v. Lumbermens' Mutual Cas. Co., 77 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 1954),
aff'd, 86 So. 2d 515 (1956), noted in 7 HASTINms L.J. 213 (1956).
10. Keegan v. Keegan, 194 Minn. 261, 260 N.W. 318 (1935), allowed an award to
a widow, member of a partnership, for the death of her husband, an employee of the
firm. The opinion refers to the entity approach of parts of the Uniform Partnership
Act, to the Bankruptcy Act, and to the statutes permitting suit against the partnership
in the common name, all as showing a trend away from the common law aggregate
theory. A similar result was reached in Felice v. Felice, 34 N.J. Super. 388, 112
A.2d 581 (Super. Ct. 1955), where there was an injury to the employed wife of a
partner. In Monson v. Arcand, 239 Minn. 336, 58 N.W.2d 753 (1953), aff'd, 70
N.W.2d 364 (1955) it was held that an injured employee of a partnership, which is
subject to a workmen's compensation act, and carries insurance, can maintain an action
for injuries against a partner whose fault caused the injuries, as a third party, he not
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The coprincipal doctrine has been carried over into the field of
non-profit unincorporated associations. This occured in the often cited
case of a member of a grange, helping serve meals at a concession at
a county fair, injured by an exploding steam table due to negligence of
a fellow member." It may make sense to view the members of a
relatively small social organization in the activities of which most of
the members take part in the same light as partners in an ordinary
partnership or joint adventure in which management is shared. But
in the case of a large, well financed social group, such as a Temple of
the Mystic Shrine, with concentration of management in a fairly stable
group of elected officers, it is not so clear that the rank and file mem-
ber is a coprincipal. In a case of an initiate who was injured in the
course of horseplay following the ritualistic initiation, and who was
therefore a member, liability was imposed on the local association. 12
It is in the field of labor organizations that the coprincipal doctrine
has been most frequently invoked in recent years. The prevalence of
the union shop has forced many workers to join, like the lawyer in
the jurisdiction whose bar is integrated, and who must pay dues to
the bar association with whose objectives he has little sympathy.' 3
Not only may there be no real freedom of choice, sometimes, for the
member as to whether he will join or abandon his occupation, but
there is no delectus personarum as to his fellow members, some of
whom may become officers. There is concentration of management in
the elected officers. Union democracy is a goal toward which progress
is slowly being made, largely as a result of legislation.14
Many courts have treated the labor organization like the general
partnership in applying the coprincipal doctrine as regards liability
for negligent action or inaction. A leading case is Hromek v.
being an employer of the firm's employee. The partner's individual liability is not
covered by the insurance carried by the firm. A contrary result was reached in
Mazzuchelli v. Silberberg, 29 N.J. 15, 148 A.2d 8 (1959), holding that a partner
negligently injuring an employee of the partnership was within the protection of the
workmen's compensation act, and not subject to a common law action as a third party.
The opinion reviews decisions and arguments as to whether under the Uniform
Partnership Act a partnership should be treated as an entity.
11. De Villars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333 (1950), with copious annotation
at 14 A.L.R.2d 473 (1950).
12. Thomas v. Dunne, 131 Colo. 20, 279 P.2d 427 (1955). The action was brought
under a common name statute against the Temple and some of its officers. Liability,
however, was restricted to the treasury of the Temple. While members of an associa-
tion can by contract restrict liability to the joint funds, it has seemed questionable that
they should evade liability for tort committed by their agents within the scope of their
authority. See LLOYD, UNincoapoRATED AssocrnoNs 158 (1938).
13. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
14. Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
Hnv. L. 1sv.. 851 (1960); Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72
HAIav. L. REv. 609 (1959).
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Gemeinde5 in which the plaintiff member was denied a remedy in
an action against the union for injuries suffered as a result of negli-
gence of its representatives. It was held that the union was not a legal
entity, although for procedural convenience it could be sued in the
common name. But there is, in such circumstances, no cause of
action. The same result has been reached where the member has
attempted to recover from the union for negligent inaction in preserv-
ing his rights against the employer under collective bargaining agree-
mnents. 1
6
A variance from the conventional coprincipal rule was introduced
in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which had decided the Hromek
-case, by distinguishing the situation in which the union owes a duty
,of representation, particularly to the member, from that where a duty
is owed to the public.17 It had previously been held that where the
aunion is acting intentionally adversely to the member, he has a cause
,of action. Such cases include wrongful expulsion from the organiza-
tion, 8 discharge by the employer caused by the union,19 and more
recently assault and battery in order to quell opposition to the policies
of the management of the union.20
A difficulty with the cause of action for negligent or wilful failure
to represent the member in a controversy with the employer is that
the right of the organization to act, as in demanding grievance pro-
cedure, is based on the collective bargaining agreement, which creates
rights in the organization.21 Whether the management of the organiza-
tion should assert such rights in a particular situation is a question of
:business judgment to be decided in the light of all the interests
involved,2 somewhat similar to the question of whether the manage-
ament of a corporation should have instituted some proceeding against
15. 238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941).
16. Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952); McClees v. Grand
Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 59 Ohio App. 477, 18 N.E.2d 812 (1938).
17. Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 248, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782
(1960), noted in 13 STAN. L. REv. 123 (1960) (failure to set in motion grievance
:procedure against employer, as provided for by collective bargaining agreement).
18. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Williams
-v. National Ass'n of Masters Local 2, 384 Pa. 413, 120 A.2d 896 (1956).
19. Kuzma v. Millinery Workers Union Local 24, 27 N.J. Super. 579, 99 A.2d 833
,(Sup. Ct. 1953).
20. Inglis v. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 18 Cal. Rptr. 187, 373 P.2d 467 (1961),
aff'd, 23 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1962).
21. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARtv. L. R~v. 601 (1956). There
are no direct rights in the members unless the agreement so provides. Finnegan v.
Penn. R.R., 76 N.J. Super. 71, 183 A.2d 779 (Super. Ct. 1962).
22. Palnau v. Detroit Edison Co., 301 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1962); Fiorita v. Mc-
Corkle, 222 Md. 524, 161 A.2d 456 (1960); Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 75 N.J.
Super. 383, 183 A.2d 415 (Super Ct. 1962).
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an officer or a third person, later made the subject of a shareholder's
derivative suit.23
Finally, there has been a breakthrough of the rule of non-liability of
the labor organization for injuries caused by negligence in a matter
in which there is no special personal duty owed the member. Marshall
v. International Longshoreman's & Warehousemen's Union24 is the
pioneer case. Plaintiff, a union member, was injured by falling over a
concrete obstruction in a parking lot maintained by the union for the
convenience of members attending its meetings. Alleging negligence,
plaintiff sued the union and certain of its officers. In the superior
court defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted. The
district court of appeal affirmed.2- The supreme court granted a
hearing and reversed. After noting that labor unions have often been
treated as entities, the opinion of the court states that the coprincipal
rule was developed in dealing with business partnerships treated as
aggregates. The large social organization or labor organization is
quite different in numbers and lack of authority of rank and file
members over management. To apply to them the same rule as in
partnership would sacrifice reality to theoretical formalism. Quoting
Justice Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science,26 the court held that
concepts proper enough in the field where first developed should not
be applied with disregard of consequences in the very different field
of the relationship between unions and their members.2 7 Any judg-
ment plaintiff may recover can be satisfied out of the funds and
property of the union alone.
It is to be hoped that the fiction of coprincipalship will cease to be
invoked in cases against large unincorporated associations where there
is concentration of management and no delectus personarum. That
this trend may extend to partnerships is perhaps too much to hope
for until the entity view of partnerships is more widely accepted and
the legislatures persuaded to amend section 13 of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act.
The labor organization is more and more being regarded by courts
and lawmakers as a legal entity. The rank and file member should
have the same remedy for harm done to him by his union, whether
breach of contract, intentional tort, or negligent tort, as the share-
holder in a corporation when harmed by corporate activity. The idea
23. HENN, CoRPORATIONS 576 (1961). See also Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg.
Corp., 37 IlM. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962).
24. 57 Cal. 2d 781, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 987 (1962).
25. Marshall v. International Longshoreman's & Warehousemen's Union, 197 A.C.A.
697, 17 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1961).
26. CABmzo, THE PA ADoxEs OF LEGAL SCIENCE 62 (1947).
27. 57 Cal. 2d at 787, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 215, 371 P.2d at 991.
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that the labor organization is a joint enterprise in which every member
is a principal is a fiction. As the unions become more and more
wealthy8 and active in many fields it seems appropriate that the union
treasury should bear the risk of harm to the union members, as well
as to the public.
Whether the member of the social club should be compensated out
of the common fund for injuries received while participating in
activities as a member should turn on the effectiveness of his control
of the course of activities, and the degree of concentration of manage-
ment in officers.29 The courts should be as well able to draw a line
between the Mystic Shrine Temple, with hundreds or thousands of
members and an ample treasury, and the village grange, as is done
often when a passenger is injured by the negligence of the driver of
an automobile concurrent with that of a third person, and it has to
be decided whether the passenger and driver are engaged in a joint
enterprise for the purpose of imputing negligence.
The coprincipal rule originated with partnerships at a time when
the aggregate view universally prevailed. If we come around to the
entity view, we shall find that the partner has been harmed by the
conduct of the "partnership" and not by his copartners or by the
servant of himself and his copartners. Even under the aggregate view
why should not the group jointly owe a duty to refrain from injuring
a partner? William Draper Lewis, the draftsman of the Uniform
Partnership Act and champion of the aggregate view of partnership,
accepts the validity of a contract between partnership and partner,
such as a promissory note, and asserts that unenforcibility between
the original parties is for a purely procedural reason.30 The Uniform
Partnership Act provides for a claim against the partnership in liquida-
tion by a partner for the return of his capital investment and ad-
vances.31 A partner who risks the safety of his person, or of his
separate property, while participating in carrying on the partnership
business should be as much entitled to protection as he is as regards
his financial investment in the business. If he suffers harm while
having some dealings or contact with the firm as a member of the
28. The wealth of our national unions is such as to put them in a class with some
of our large industrial corporations. Kutner, Due Process of Economy: Antitrust Control
of Labor, 24 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 12 (1962).
29. A member of an incorporated club may recover from the club for injuries suffered
from mistreatment by an employee. McClean v. University Club, 327 Mass. 68, 97
N.W.2d 174 (1951). The existence of a remedy should not turn on whether the club
is or is not incorporated.
30. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29
HARv. L. REv. 158, 186 (1915). See also RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 17 (1932).
31. UNwolim PARTNm~ansm AcT § 40(b).
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public, he should be entitled to compensation as well.32 The Uniform
Partnership Act should be amended by deleting from section 13 the
phrase "not being a partner in the partnership."
32. Compare Famey v. Hauser, 109 Kan. 75, 198 Pac. 178 (1921). A partner who
had deposited grain as a customer in an elevator operated by the partnership was held
to have a claim on accounting for loss caused by embezzlement of his property by
an employee of the firm.

